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ENCLAVE MICROPOLIS:
THE PARADOXICAL CASE
OF RAMALLAH/AL-BIREH
LISA TARAKI
Among the consequences of the consolidation of the Israeli closure
regime have been the contraction of Palestinians’ social worlds and
the emergence of new forms of localism. Unlike the more parochial
West Bank towns of Nablus, Hebron, and Jenin, Ramallah/al-Bireh
has taken on many of the cosmopolitan aspects of larger metropoles—
Beirut, Cairo, Tunis—because of a combination of historical influ-
ences, present-day migration patterns, and political realities. The result
is a paradoxical “enclave city” whose sights are oftentimes more fixed
on the global rather than the national level.
THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE SPATIAL REGIME being consolidated in the occupied West
Bank today, a result of the Israeli policy variously characterized as Bantustaniza-
tion, cantonization, enclavization, and ghettoization, have been discussed at
length in recent years. A tremendous outpouring of documentation and report-
ing, analysis, opinion, and activism has been devoted to this issue; monitoring
by international, Palestinian, and Israeli agencies and organizations has shown
the policy of fragmentation’s devastating impact on the economy, social net-
works, the provision of basic services such as healthcare and education, and
the prospects for an end to Israel’s colonization of the West Bank and Gaza.1
One of the less-analyzed aspects of the emerging spatial regime is its ef-
fect on urban life as it is lived and experienced by Palestinians. Among the
consequences of the consolidation of this regime have been the contraction of
Palestinians’ social worlds and the emergence of new forms of localism. Perhaps
the most curious and paradoxical of these is the “cosmopolitan/metropolitan”
localism of the twin cities of Ramallah/al-Bireh,2 the subject of this essay.
Ramallah/al-Bireh today is the undisputed political and cultural center of
the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, yet it is as insulated from the rest of
Palestine as the parochial localisms of Hebron, Jenin, or Nablus. The contraction
of Palestinian social worlds under the impact of the occupation’s spatial regime
has paradoxically focused the gaze of this enclave city away from the Palestinian
interior and toward the Arab world and beyond, most notably toward the city of
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Amman. This is especially expedited by the system of “VIP” travel privileges ac-
cessible and affordable to the better-off sections of the Palestinian middle class,
arrangements that considerably decrease the travel time across the torturous
Israeli and Jordanian security zones at the crossing point on the Jordan River.
Indeed, this urban island at times appears better connected to the metropoles
of the region—Amman, Cairo, Beirut, and of late Dubai—than with other, sim-
ilarly enclaved Palestinian cities and towns. The result is that this small urban
center with a population of barely over 60,000 shares certain critical features
(albeit in miniature) with these much larger Arab metropolises, most notably
the increasing social heterogeneity of the population; the growing social dis-
parities and their normalization; and the globalized, modernist urban ethos
articulated by a new middle class.
ENCLAVIZATION AS THE NEW STATUS QUO
Ghazi-Walid Falah has noted that Israeli military strategy since the outbreak
of the second Palestinian intifada in 2000 is in fact part of a long-term strategy
of spatial demolition and strangulation. Far from being a recent phenomenon,
the “enclavisation of space” has been “implemented as an instrument of spatial
expansion and control since 1967 in the Occupied West Bank but [is] rooted in
a long-standing policy of territorial expropriation—to dismember the space of
the remaining Palestinian population.”3 In a similar vein, Leila Farsakh has noted
that the Israeli permit system, the territorial fragmentation of the occupied
Palestinian territory under the Oslo accords, and the expansion of settlements
have all contributed to the creation of disconnected Palestinian population re-
serves that have the characteristics of Bantustans rather than of cantons.4 More
generally, Jeff Halper, deploying the term “matrix of control,” has described
the means by which the West Bank has been “carved into small, disconnected
enclaves, surrounded and indeed truncated by massive Israeli settlement blocs,
subject to Israeli military and economic closures.”5
The political consequences of this regime are not difficult to predict. Falah
views enclaving as a means not only of cutting off spatial interflow and heighten-
ing control, but also of sundering enclaved space from other spatial areas, thus
confining and drastically weakening the population economically, politically,
and socially—in effect “neutralizing” its challenge as a potential opponent.6
Similarly, Sari Hanafi, who describes the Israeli colonial project as “spacio-
cidal,” has noted that the policy becomes possible by deploying bio-politics
to categorize Palestinians into various “states of exception” that render them
powerless against Israel.7
There is no doubt that the spatial dismemberment of Palestinian society,
among other factors, has contributed to the fragmentation of political action.
National-level politics, a strong feature of political life in the 1970s and 1980s,
has gradually given way to more local manifestations of resistance, organiz-
ing, and activism. The near-total ban on movement between the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip, coupled with the extreme difficulty of physical mobility
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within the West Bank in recent years, has rendered coordination of national-
level political action far more difficult. As a result, localized expressions of
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organizing and resistance have emerged, especially in
response to immediate Israeli practices such as incur-
sions and sieges, assassinations, and mass arrests. More-
over, the sheer volume and diversity of such events since
2000 have rendered impractical the task of national-level
mobilization as an everyday practice. To this must be
added a degree of ennui and despair that has pervaded
the Palestinian body politic, making a national-level re-
sponse to each and every Israeli assault increasingly diffi-
cult to sustain. The more recent struggle between Fatah
and Hamas has also taken its toll on the effectiveness of
national-level coordination between the National and
Islamic Forces’ committees.
One of the consequences of the deepening spatial regime in the West Bank
and the escalating Israeli agenda of punishment is that a political and social
“division of labor” is taking shape whereby different locales assume varying
social and political functions and significance. While certain places, such as
refugee camps, continue in their changeless burden of resistance to the unend-
ing regime of deadly raids and arrests, others have been marked as sites for the
articulation of new forms of civil resistance, often in cooperation with interna-
tional and Israeli solidarity groups. Strategically situated military checkpoints
and certain villages, such as Bil‘in in the Ramallah district, Umm Salamuna in
the Bethlehem region, and others in the north, have become new arenas of
confrontation and resistance. The separation wall still being built in the West
Bank has emerged as a symbol of Palestinian dispossession, its sheer magnitude
making it a destination for international and Israeli activists.
Another consequence of the new spatial status quo is the sharpening of
place-specific identities and ambiences. The smaller cities of the West Bank,
such as Qalqilya, Tulkarm, and Jenin, suffer especially from the impact of the
separation wall, unemployment, and the flight of businesses. The once-thriving
city of Nablus, the West Bank’s historic center of trade and production, is be-
sieged by a ring of military checkpoints and violated by near-daily incursions
by the Israeli army. Armed resistance is a staple feature of Nablus’s relationship
to the Israeli occupation. Normal life is increasingly difficult in this desolate
landscape; the flight of many of the city’s businesses and professionals, who
have relocated to Ramallah and Jordan, is the subject of much commentary
among business people, intellectuals, and politicians discussing the fate of this
once-flourishing center of political and commercial life.8 The old center of He-
bron has become a ghost town where armed colonists rule the streets with
protection from the Israeli army. While the city of Hebron hosted the inaugu-
ration of its first modern supermarket in August 2007, it is still an enclaved and
insular city, no longer an active participant in the dynamic national politics of
two decades ago.9
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East Jerusalem, once the center of political organizing and cultural life and
still the capital of Palestine in the national imagination, has been encircled,
atomized, and rendered inaccessible to the rest of the West Bank except by
difficult-to-obtain passes issued by the Israeli military. In this situation, the city’s
social and political elite has not been able to articulate a coherent strategy of
resistance and has lost its leading political role. In this it has been supplanted
by Ramallah, the seat of the Palestinian Authority and of the major PLO political
factions.
Ramallah suffered a concentrated regimen of sieges and assaults between
the outbreak of the second intifada in 2000 and the 2004 death of Yasir Arafat,
besieged in his Ramallah stronghold until his last days. Now, though not spared
the Israeli army’s lethal forays and almost daily waves of arrests, Ramallah
has acquired the reputation of a “five-star prison,” with a decided emphasis
on the “five-star” rather than the “prison.” In fact, Ramallah today, especially
as the Israeli regime of control intensifies, is viewed increasingly as an oa-
sis of normalcy (and decadence) in a desolate landscape of shattered urban
spaces and violated rural expanses. Much of the popular analysis attributes
this state of affairs to the hegemonic influence of a corrupt elite comprising
influential figures in the Palestinian Authority, the business sector, and NGOs
based in the city. In reality, however, Ramallah’s urbanizing trajectory long
predated the Oslo regime and can be traced to the first decades of the last
century.
THE MAKING OF A MIDDLE-CLASS PROJECT
Ramallah/al-Bireh’s fortunes and misfortunes have long been bound up with
the movement of people—the influx of refugees and other migrants and the
emigration of natives. The twin towns entered the twentieth century as villages,
but Ramallah in particular was endowed with two important features that were
to prove critical for its future development as a regional market town and ad-
ministrative center (and a home to the middle class): the presence of a sizeable
number of foreign-based, church-related institutions, and the beginning of emi-
gration to the Americas. The few available histories of Ramallah, mostly written
by natives and e´migre´s, emphasize its Christian identity through the first half of
the twentieth century.10 The establishment of Christian institutions in Ramallah
was not without consequences, however. The early establishment of interna-
tional Christian institutions in Ramallah led to its social differentiation from
al-Bireh. The educational opportunities at the church-sponsored schools facili-
tated emigration from Ramallah, which imparted an element of distinction to
the town and gave it a social and economic advantage. Social distance between
the two towns increased, reflected in educational levels, modes of dress, and
lifestyles.11
The arrival of the British in Palestine in 1917 and the establishment of the
Mandate five years later marked a decisive moment in the history of the towns. A
not-insignificant number of Ramallah residents were employed in the Mandate
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bureaucracy. By the early 1920s, a building boom was underway that lasted well
into the 1930s, attracting increasing numbers of workers and craftsmen. Under
the impact of the construction boom, financed in large part by remittances from
the towns’ e´migre´s, building styles began to change. Modern concepts in the
design of domestic space were reflected in several buildings of this era, such
as the ‘Elayyan home in al-Bireh.12 Buildings increasingly were characterized
by a new urban style. Hamula-based quarters (harat), which had formed the
core of the original towns of Ramallah and al-Bireh,13 began to lose their social
distinctiveness as residents dispersed outwards from the town centers, building
mostly along the main arteries linking the towns to surrounding villages.
But the key turning point in the modern history of Ramallah/al-Bireh, as
indeed of other towns and cities in Palestine, was the 1948 Nakba. The war
ushered in tremendous transformations in Palestinian urban life. The most dev-
astating of these was the irreversible vanishing of Arab urban life as lived by
Palestinians in West Jerusalem and in the coastal cities of Jaffa and Haifa. For
the smaller and less cosmopolitan towns in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the
major effect of the Nakba was the influx of internally displaced refugees who
remained within the borders of Mandate Palestine. In 1953, a Jordanian census
recorded that 67 percent of Ramallah’s 13,500 inhabitants were refugees.14
The vast majority of refugees who made their way to Ramallah/al-Bireh in the
hot days of July 1948 were peasants from villages near al-Lidd (Lydda), Ramla,
and Jaffa who settled—often after several temporary relocations—in al-Bireh,
Qaddura refugee camp, and later in Am‘ari and Jalazon camps.15 A smaller
group of refugees consisted of middle-class families (both Muslim and Chris-
tian) from the coastal towns themselves. Many of the Christian migrants settled
in the environs of Ramallah’s old town core.
At the same time, the Nakba accelerated the pace of emigration among
natives of the two towns. Ramallah historian Naseeb Shaheen notes that at the
end of the mandate regime in 1948, some two hundred Ramallawis who had
been employed by Mandate institutions suddenly found themselves jobless.16
This, along with a favorable change in American immigration policy and the
presence of family members already settled there, encouraged the emigration
of more Ramallah and al-Bireh natives to the United States.17
While pre-1948 Ramallah was by no means a homogenous community, new
social cleavages and new bases of social differentiation began to appear with
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the influx of refugees following the war. Still, although
the native middle class of traders, shopkeepers, for-
mer Mandate employees, and a few professionals was
depleted by emigration, the continuity of the middle
class was retained through the arrival of urban refugees
from al-Lidd, Jaffa, and Ramla. The middle class compo-
nent was strengthened during Jordanian rule (1950–67),
when Ramallah began to attract increasing numbers of
professionals and government employees. Private (and
some public) educational institutions, including Birzeit
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College in the nearby village of Birzeit, played an important role in augmenting
the middle class. After the 1970s, emigration to the Arab world, particularly
to the Gulf, was also critical, primarily because the remittances sent by work-
ing family members helped improve living standards and educational levels at
home.
During the first two decades of occupation, and until the outbreak of the
first intifada in 1987, emigration, the colonial relationship with Israel, and ex-
panding educational opportunities were the main engines of the changing class
structure of the West Bank and Gaza. Modalities of engagement with the Israeli
economy were varied, but in general they were to be found in wage labor in
Israel, labor subcontracting, and retail trade. Incomes rose in real terms, and for
the refugees of the camps, work in Israel became a primary source of income.
The role of higher education in the crystallization of a Palestinian middle
class has been noted elsewhere.18 Ramallah was one of the most important
sites in this process, not only in attracting students from all over the West Bank
and Gaza to its several educational institutions, but also because it was the
most hospitable site for the relocation of many graduates of these institutions.
In addition, it was in the ambience of Ramallah that many youths from vil-
lages first experienced the heady mix of politics, urban lifestyles, and different
sensibilities.
Many of the diverse influences that have come together to make the present
reality of Ramallah/al-Bireh were thus in place by the 1970s. There is no ques-
tion, however, that the establishment of the Palestinian Authority after the Oslo
accords in 1993 was another watershed in Ramallah’s journey from small vil-
lage to central city for the Palestinians in the occupied territories. The import
of the Oslo accords is considered to be primarily political; however, the new
regime that ensued from the accords had far-reaching social effects as well,
particularly for the kind of place Ramallah was to become.
REPRESENTATIONS OF RAMALLAH: FROM “FIVE-STAR PRISON”
TO “GREEN ZONE”
Seven years into the second intifada and the intensification of the spatial
regime of cantonization, Ramallah’s status as a city apart has been consolidated.
Since 2000, it has become more socially heterogeneous than it was at the onset
of the Oslo process. In reality, and despite its small size, Ramallah is acquiring
most of the attributes of contemporary metropolises in the region, including a
visible globalized lifestyle and new sensibilities whose most enthusiastic carrier
is the aspiring new middle class. This is happening despite the fact that death
and destruction are not far away; in some respects, the new urban ethos in
Ramallah is reminiscent of the mythic resilience of Beirut, a war-ravaged city
that nevertheless “knows how to live.”
Western and Israeli journalists have been the most enthusiastic promoters of
the new Ramallah, focusing on its cafe´s, restaurants, theaters, fitness centers,
and cultural venues; wonderment that Palestinians are capable of intelligible
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lives pervades these journalistic writings. Ramallah is variously depicted as
proof of the resilience of the middle class, the victory of globalization, the
defeat of the resistance, or of the PA’s ability to assure normalcy in a time of
conflict and strife.
Palestinian sentiments about the city tend to be strong and are themselves
indicative of emerging political and social divisions. Part of the intelligentsia
views Ramallah as the promising incubator of a cosmopolitan and secular ethos,
while another despises it as the seat of a corrupt and capitulatory elite. Ramallah
also elicits bitterness and anger among ordinary people as a city prospering at
the expense of the marginalized zones in the new spatial regime.
Joseph Massad’s scathing indictment of Ramallah is a commentary on the
city’s new role in Palestine’s emerging landscape:
Ramallah proper (excluding the surrounding villages) continues to
be what many now refer to as the Palestinian Green Zone, shelter-
ing, in addition to the intelligence staff of Israel and Israel-friendly
Arab countries, those Palestinians who are paid and protected by
the Oslo process, whether the Oslo bureaucracy, its technicians
and hired intellectuals, or the business and middle classes recently
habituated to the new name-brand consumerism that the Green
Zone can offer. This opulent life contrasts with the life of the rest
of the Palestinians outside Ramallah who live in misery, hunger, and
under the bombardment of the Israelis and the attacks of savage
Jewish colonial settlers, not to mention the harassment by Fatah.19
A cadre of the People’s Party in Far‘a refugee camp near Nablus expresses
popular sentiment in this depiction of Ramallah night life:
The nights of Nablus, Rafah and Jenin are very different from the
nights of Ramallah . . . the Ramallah night is deep red, not from
the blood of the martyrs who fell in defense of the land and of our
honor, but from the doings of the knights of chatter and greedy
chiefs vying for power and a piece of the cake. The night begins
with a search for the best restaurant or hotel to exchange gossip
about promotions and to brag about acts of heroism . . . A tragedy
in Jenin is occasion for stealing the funds earmarked for its healing;
a nakba in Rafah is an opportunity for competition between elites;
and a catastrophe in Nablus is a subject for long hours spent in
meetings.20
While such sentiments and representations provide rich ammunition for an-
imated polemics, they do not capture the everyday lived reality of the city. In
particular, the critique misses the social import of what is transpiring: the fact
that for some time now Ramallah has been on an urbanizing trajectory, becom-
ing more like a city, with all its complexity, contradictions, and possibilities.
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Without doubt, the establishment in the wake of the 1993 Oslo accords of the
much-excoriated PA hastened this process: Its arrival led to the surprisingly
rapid elaboration of a new globalized urban middle-class ethos and lifestyle,
which found its most hospitable terrain in Ramallah and its most ardent articu-
lators and advocates among the new middle class, including veterans of the po-
litical parties. Ramallah, having long since lost its native sons and daughters and
therefore not burdened with an entrenched local elite (such as was left largely
intact in Nablus and Hebron, for example), was taken over by the PA’s new
political administration with its many security apparatuses and departments.
Many of the new higher-ranking bureaucrats were PLO figures allowed to enter
the West Bank and Gaza after decades of exile. These returnees (‘a’idin), while
small in number, made their imprint on Ramallah’s cultural and social scene
through their outlook and lifestyles, all of which contributed to the elaboration
of the urban and modernist ethos they had imbibed in Beirut, Tunis, and other
Arab cities.
It is true that the new Ramallah was made possible by the investments of
local and expatriate capital, but the modern, globalized ethos and lifestyle on
display are embodied and articulated by the rank and file of the middle class in
everyday social practices in actual places. I would note parenthetically that, as
in the rest of the Arab world, the ideal of a “modern life” is not new in Palestine
and was embraced by the small urban middle class in Jaffa, Haifa, and Jerusalem
before the Nakba and in the inland cities of Nablus, Ramallah, and Bethlehem
in the same period and afterward. But the expansion of the middle class, due
mainly to higher education and emigration in past decades, has thrust new
sectors of society into the modern mode. Critical decisions about presents and
futures and the quality of lives confront individuals with increasing urgency.
The sites where modern sensibilities are acquired include private schools,
music academies, cultural centers, and other important nexuses of social in-
teraction such as theaters, fitness centers, cafe´s, restaurants, upscale super-
markets, and a miniature mall. The most strategic of sites for the elaboration
of modern subjectivities are educational institutions, if we conceive of educa-
tion broadly as the acquisition of critical kinds of knowledge, competencies,
and dispositions. While Palestinians have long been noted for their dedication
to education, the determined pursuit of new forms of cultural and academic
capital distinguishes the new middle class’s fervor for the “right” educational
experience for its children from the aspirations of peasants or refugees of past
decades. Competence in foreign languages and Western cultural protocols is
critical here. As in other Arab countries where private schools (and increas-
ingly, private universities) use foreign languages in instruction, so, too, the best
schools in Ramallah aim at making foreign languages, primarily English, second
nature to the children of the middle class, many of whose parents are recent
migrants from villages and other towns in the West Bank (some are from Gaza).
While the experiences of students remain restricted and local, the de-
termined pursuit by the new middle class of enrichment for their children
through studying arts and other skills ensures that they are able to compete in
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globalized cultural and academic markets. For example, at the Quaker-run
Friends Boys’ School (actually a coeducational school) in Ramallah, the lo-
cal matriculation examination track (the Tawjihi ) has not had any takers for
the past two academic years; most of the students opt for the International
Baccalaureate program instead. In this school, English is a core part of the
curriculum, and many school activities have a strong international flavor.
No other city in Palestine has such an eclectic and diverse middle class,
which has given Ramallah/al-Bireh its unique character. There is plenty of evi-
dence of increased migration from the rest of the West Bank to the city in the
past decade, particularly from the northern regions (the results of the second
Palestinian census of December 2007 can be expected to verify this observa-
tion). Most migrants are employees of the PA and other public institutions,
workers in the building trade, and owners of businesses. Many of them—
especially those of modest means—have settled in newly developed parts of
the town and in adjacent villages that are being rapidly incorporated into the
urban center.
One of the contributions of Ramallah’s middle class has been the articulation
of a secular and modern outlook, in flagrant contradiction to both the hege-
monic culture of resistance of the national movement since the 1970s and the
Islamist vision that has gained currency in Palestinian society in recent years.
Ramallah’s historic Christian identity is relevant here: Despite the emigration of
most of the original Christian families and the fact that the majority of the pop-
ulation is now Muslim,21 the Christian association is an important ingredient
in the construction of the city as it is imagined today.
Paradoxically, by asserting the Christian identity of the city, the intellectu-
als, professionals, business people, and others who have hitched their fortunes
to Ramallah are in fact underlining its secularism. They want Ramallah to be
more like Beirut and Cairo than Hebron or Jedda.22 This tendency highlights
the problematic linking of Christian identity and social and political outlook.
A prevailing perception in Palestine holds that Palestinian Christians are less
socially conservative than Muslims, primarily in matters having to do with the
public conduct of women and relations between women and men. This rep-
resentation ignores class and regional factors. The residents of ‘Ayn ‘Arik and
Tayyiba, two predominantly Christian villages in the Ramallah region, for ex-
ample, probably have more in common with their fellow Muslim villagers than
they do with the Christian upper-class residents of Masyoun. It also bears men-
tion that certain groups of Muslims who settled in Ramallah (a prime example
being the returnees) had just as much—if not more—to do with enhancing
the secular outlook of the town as the Christians did. Nonetheless, the official
myth of the city’s Christian identity persists and has played an important role
in engraving Ramallah’s place in the Palestinian imagination as an open and
cosmopolitan city. Such notions also have their practical uses: for example,
Ramallah’s cafe´ and restaurant culture is vitalized by the fact that alcohol li-
censes can be granted to restaurants there, while they are not allowed in adja-
cent al-Bireh.
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A POLARIZING CITY
The arrival of the PA also had important consequences for the physical ap-
pearance of the city, as property laws and zoning regulations were changed
to allow for the ownership of individual units in apartment buildings and the
construction of multi-storey buildings. The skyline of Ramallah changed dra-
matically in the decade following the Oslo accords; the signature red-tiled roofs
of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century houses gave way to the bulldozers,
and those that were spared found themselves hemmed in by apartment blocks
and office buildings. With incoming investment, new villas were also built.
A note about scale and quality is in order here. In Ramallah (as in the rest
of the occupied areas), there is no equivalent to the opulent lifestyle of the
super-rich in the Arab world’s major cities; the Palestinian bourgeoisie was
dispersed far and wide in 1948, and not all of the few wealthy Palestinian
entrepreneurs investing in Palestine today have their homes there. Indeed,
the villas of Ramallah that elicit ridicule are more like the homes of middling
entrepreneurs in Amman or Cairo than the fabulous palaces of local popular
imagination. The middle class is also small, consisting mostly of employees and
functionaries of the public and NGO sectors, with a growing cadre of business
and other professionals.
The changes in zoning regulations, the rise in land prices, and the availabil-
ity of housing loans and commercial building schemes had important social
dimensions as well: One of the more noteworthy effects of the post-Oslo urban
regime in Ramallah has been the deepening of residential segregation and the
salience of place-based class and status differentials. Different kinds of neigh-
borhoods began to appear, ranging from choice areas such as Masyoun and
Tireh to more popular (sha‘bi ) settlements on the outskirts of the towns.
The better-kept and better-serviced areas are out of bounds for the lower
middle class of public employees, shopkeepers, and white-collar service and
clerical workers. These segments of the middle class may have had a chance
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to realize their dream of an apartment in a new neigh-
borhood, but more likely than not, these lower-middle-
class neighborhoods have become desolate places with
little greenery, poor public services, and few ameni-
ties or public facilities. A new neighborhood with the
unseemly name of Umm al-Sharayit is one of these ar-
eas: a sprawling settlement housing a hodgepodge of
badly kept apartment buildings, public facilities such
as PA ministries, commercial establishments, sha‘bi
restaurants, automobile repair shops, and wedding
halls.
A better appreciation of the growing social disparities that have deepened
since the 1990s can be gleaned from an examination of the changing relation-
ship between the city and its underclass in the refugee camps. Three camps
have figured prominently in the life of Ramallah: Am‘ari, Qalandia, and Jalazon.
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Another smaller (and unofficial) camp is Qaddura, in the heart of the Ramallah
commercial district, which is actually more akin to an impoverished neigh-
borhood of the town than a camp set apart from the fabric of the city (as
Am‘ari). Thanks to its central location, Am‘ari occupies an important place in
the life of Ramallah/al-Bireh, not least because it has presented itself as a uni-
fied community vis-a`-vis the two towns, particularly al-Bireh, on whose lands
the camp is located and to which many of the camp residents have moved fol-
lowing improvements in their financial condition. Historically, Am‘ari for the
middle class of Ramallah (households, merchants, community institutions, the
municipality) has meant different things: a reservoir of labor (notwithstanding
employment in Israel, which provided more income to camp workers during
the 1970s and 1980s), the object of charitable works, a site of resistance to
the occupation, and an address for politicians to approach—for instance, dur-
ing electoral campaigns—for political mobilization or to demonstrate dispute
resolution skills. Even as a zone of exclusion stigmatized by Ramallah’s middle
and upper-middle class, Am‘ari nevertheless served as a surrogate conscience
for the very same social groups in a different era. During the first intifada, for
instance, the towns’ prosperous merchants—highly mindful of their duty to
support the resistance—paid their political dues by supplying the camp with
food and provisions during the long sieges (a practice that also involved nearby
villages and the Jalazon camp).
In the 1970s and 1980s, despite the tensions inherent in the juxtaposition
of a community of dispossessed refugees and a differentiated town, several
factors worked against open conflict between the camp and the surround-
ing urban area. Prior to Oslo, the reigning nationalist orthodoxy downplayed
social disparities, denounced the flaunting of wealth and privilege, and dis-
couraged a culture of “normalcy” in the face of occupation and repression.
This was especially the case during the first intifada, when expressions of
frivolity were discouraged (if not banned), and an ascetic culture of resistance
informed by peasant or imagined peasant values was hegemonic. Under these
circumstances, unity in the face of a common enemy muted the deep-seated
antagonisms between the camp and the town.
This picture of relative coexistence between the camps and the town began
to change with the installation of the PA. As social cleavages deepened and
Ramallah became Palestine’s premier city, the language of coexistence began to
change. Several incidents, strongly reminiscent of classic acts of urban violence
in world cities where the dispossessed attack the perceived symbols of privilege
and power, have occurred in recent years.
RECASTING RESISTANCE, TRADITION, AND RESILIENCE
The growing cleavages between the camps and Ramallah/al-Bireh are re-
flected in the less tangible yet very real tension between the middle class’s
engagement with modernity, secularism, and globalization on the one hand
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and the ascetic culture of resistance (a product of the national struggle in the
1970s and 1980s) that continues to be the dominant ethos among most Pales-
tinians on the other. The fact that the occupation regime deepens its hold on
Palestinian land while the struggle against the occupation continues without
any breakthrough contributes to the hegemony of the ethos of resistance in
Palestinian society in general.
Resilience and steadfastness (sumud ) have been staples of the Palestinian
ethos for generations now. Sumud’s incarnations have been many, but the
dominant motif has been Palestinians’ determination to continue under adver-
sity, fortified by their roots in their land, the strength of their traditions, and
family and kin solidarity. Sumud has had a dull and unglamorous history, how-
ever: Martyrdom, imprisonment, and exile have been its backdrop, and it is
difficult to envision joie de vivre as one of its elements. While this motif con-
tinues to hold sway among vast sections of the population, including the new
middle class (which may invoke it on critical occasions), a new conception
of resilience has been taking root, one that is not based on an ascetic denial
of frivolity, joy, or entertainment, but rather renders the very pursuit of hap-
piness a manifestation of resilience and of resistance at the same time. The
legendary resilience of Beirutis, who are perceived as living life to its fullest
despite the turmoil of war and strife, is certainly an inspiration here. Yet while
some sections of the Lebanese middle class may not feel the need to enno-
ble its pursuit of happiness by casting it as a form of resistance, Ramallah’s
cultural elite and its functionaries, more accountable to the force of popular
opinion, must be ever so vigilant in maintaining the delicate balance between
old and new cultural sensitivities lest they appear to be abandoning the duty of
resistance.
The tension between new and orthodox sensibilities can be discerned
in the attitude toward folklore. In the hegemonic nationalist ethos, “folk-
lore” is sacrosanct, and much of the cultural production in the 1970s and
1980s glorified peasant values, leading a Palestinian cultural critic—not surpris-
ingly a returnee—to lament the “adoration of folklore” in Palestinian national
discourse.23
One of the most urgent tasks of the middle class has been to elaborate a new
cultural sensibility, at once responsive to the obligation of resistance and to the
need for a normalization of life. Its intellectuals and other cultural workers
provide the ideological scaffolding for this enterprise, but the rank and file—
the consumers of the new culture—are its true practitioners and articulators.
Balancing between these two imperatives involves being at peace with “folk-
lore” but open to global cultural currents. In Ramallah’s contemporary cultural
scene, emphases on resistance and authenticity wane or surge according to the
severity of Israeli assaults.
In a keynote address at the silver jubilee of El-Funoun, a Ramallah-based
dance troupe, the critical intellectual Azmi Bishara went further than most
intellectuals in his critique of the Palestinian engagement with heritage and
folklore. To him, the obsession with folklore and heritage is in fact part of a
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colonial and Orientalist project, and the Palestinians would do well to recognize
this colonization of their minds:
While the occupier celebrates its monopoly over modernity and
progress, it does not mind at all when our heritage is occupied by
folklore and Orientalism. I salute you for breaking this rule which
they hoped to dictate to us, after they had destroyed in the Nakba
a fledgling Palestinian project of modernization.24
Omar Barghouti, a choreographer at El-Funoun, explains the difficult process
that led this maverick dance troupe to liberate itself from the heavy baggage
of the national ethos:
Throughout the 1980s and during the first Palestinian intifada, re-
sistance meant nourishing the roots and expressing the attributes
of Palestinian national identity that had been suppressed by the
Israeli occupation. Starting in the mid 1990s, however, El-Funoun’s
mission has transformed itself. The group found that preservation
and survival were no longer sufficient—to create and participate in
forging a contemporary cultural identity became more urgent. To
this day, El-Funoun respects Palestinian heritage but also explores,
absorbs, and integrates modernity. The challenge is to intervene
in the development of Palestinian identity, to critique stagnation,
capitulation and despair, to envision a new, modern identity that
is rooted, yet in dialogue with life, with progress, with universal
rights and freedoms. At first, El-Funoun suffered turbulent inter-
nal debates and a great deal of soul-searching until it established a
crucial link between authenticity and contemporariness.25
* * *
As with all other trends in Palestine, one cannot be certain whether the
urbanizing trajectory of Ramallah will be aborted or allowed to continue. It ap-
pears, however, that the inexorable forces of globalization and urbanization—
and concomitant globalized middle-class lifestyles—are penetrating all corners
of the world, even those most peripheral to the urban system, and even in
localities marked by war, conflict, and pronounced vulnerability. Despite the
realities of colonization and military occupation, and in the absence of a state,
Ramallah/al-Bireh’s nascent middle class partakes enthusiastically in the trans-
Arab urban middle-class ethos elaborated in centers of Arab modernity—Beirut,
Cairo, Tunis, and of late, Amman and Dubai. Paradoxically, this ethos is not un-
folding in the context of postcolonial state formation, but rather, in the shadow
of its exact opposite: the fragmentation of the nation and the rapid demise of
the Palestinian state-building project. This very fragmentation, however, may
have enabled an “enclave city” whose sights are more fixed on the outside than
on the fractured nation within.
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